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In multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs) held under the auspices of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), trade-offs usually are
made within the issue-areas that are on the agenda.1 However, the scope
for within-issue trade-offs (linkages) is not always sufficient to achieve an
agreement. In that case, negotiators need to be willing and able to investigate
the feasibility of cross-issue linkages, since in principle these will increase
both the scope for mutually beneficial agreements and the potential gains
from trade. By explicitly recognizing the constraints embodied in the status
quo and investigating the possibility of making linkages across issues, ne-
gotiators may be able to reach agreements whose outcomes are more ben-
eficial for all concerned.
While cross-issue linkages are made in MTNs, in practice they tend to be
forged in the closing stage of negotiations, apparently often without much
aid in terms of prior substantive analysis of the possible options. To my
The research and writing of this article were carried out at the Institute for Public Policy
Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. The work was supported in part by a grant from
the Ford Foundation for a program of research on international trade policy. The views ex-
pressed are my own. I am grateful to the government officials in Washington, D.C., and Geneva
who provided me with relevant documents and allowed me to interview them in November
and December 1987. I also thank Paul Courant, Alan Deardorff, John H. Jackson, and Robert
M. Stern for their advice. Detailed comments and suggestions by Stephen Krasner and two
anonymous referees of International Organization greatly improved the article.
1. Seven rounds of negotiations have been completed to date. The last round was the Tokyo
Round, which was concluded in 1979. An eighth round, the Uruguay Round, was launched in
August 1986 and is still in progress. For information on the Tokyo Round, see Leslie Glick,
Multilateral Trade Negotiations: World Trade After the Tokyo Round (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman
& Allanheld, 1984); and Gilbert Winham, International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986). For information on the Uruguay Round,
see C. Michael Aho and Jonathan D. Aronson, Trade Talks: America Better Listen! (New
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1985); J. Michael Finger and A. Olechowski, eds., The
Uruguay Round: A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Washington, D.C.:
World Bank, 1987); and Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, Trading for Growth: The Next
Round of Trade Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1985).
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694 International Organization
knowledge, formal analytic input in the negotiation process is usually limited
to quantitative modeling efforts that estimate the possible effects of various
options on variables such as welfare, net exports, and employment.2 In-
creasingly, however, trade negotiations concern nontariff measures (NTMs)
for which quantification is often impossible. Although less precise, a qual-
itative approach may then be the only feasible one.
The objective of this article is to develop an analytic framework that can
be used by policymakers and analysts to determine the need for cross-issue
linkages. The first section of the article discusses some of the constraints
imposed on and by negotiators in MTNs. The second focuses on quantitative
analytic approaches, while the third proposes a qualitative one. The fourth
section applies the qualitative methodology to the issue of developing mul-
tilateral safeguards to protect domestic industries from problems related to
increases in imports, an important issue that was discussed at length in the
Tokyo Round negotiations and appears again on the Uruguay Round agenda.
Background: trade negotiations and the
role of issue linkages
The raison d'etre of GATT and the negotiations held under its auspices is
to help nations agree to behave in a cooperative manner that ensures an
outcome which is beneficial to all parties and more acceptable than if each
had acted independently. Outcomes associated with noncooperative behav-
ior are generally inefficient in that there are likely to exist alternatives that
can improve things for all concerned. An agreement to negotiate implies a
recognition of the existence of potential gains from cooperation.3
To a large extent, MTNs are equivalent to barter. That is, trades occur
in a setting in which there is no generally accepted medium of exchange
(money). Barter is possible when there are enforced property rights, when
marginal valuations of goods differ, and when potential transactors can meet
2. There are numerous studies estimating the effects of various types of liberalization of
tariffs and nontariff measures, both globally and by sector. Agriculture, in particular, has been
the focus of an immense amount of research. Models have been based on partial or general
equilibrium approaches. For a recent study of Uruguay Round liberalization options, see Alan
V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern, "Alternative Scenarios for Trade Liberalization," Discus-
sion Paper no. 217, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, July 1988. Studies on the Tokyo Round include the following: William R. Cline et
al.. Trade Negotiations in the Tokyo Round (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977);
Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern, The Michigan Model of Production and Trade (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986); and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Assessment of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (New York: United Nations,
1982).
3. The outcome of noncooperative behavior is often assumed to be a Nash equilibrium. Here,
it is assumed that given the actions of all other nations, each nation will act to maximize its
own objectives. Prisoner's dilemma is a model of such a situation. Cooperative outcomes are
usually defined to be Pareto-optimal—that is, no party can gain without another party losing.
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Issue linkages 695
each other. As any good introductory textbook of economics explains, how-
ever, barter is inefficient. Indeed, its inefficiency is one of the historical
reasons for the creation of money. But in international relations there is
usually no "money," and nations are therefore forced to barter. Bartering
entails three kinds of inefficiencies: (1) the "market" (total supply) may not
offer any goods that a trader is interested in obtaining; (2) a trader who has
something another wants may not be interested in what the other has to
offer but may be interested in the goods of a third party; and (3) it may not
be possible to equate marginal valuations of the various goods. If the first
possibility occurs, trade will not be possible and the status quo will be
maintained. If the second possibility occurs, trade will only be feasible if
the third party can be found and happens to be interested in the first party's
goods, so that each trader has something that another wants. In this context,
economists sometimes speak of the need for a "double coincidence of wants."
Even if this condition is met, trade will only occur if marginal valuations
can be equated. This is the third potential problem mentioned above. If it
cannot be solved—for example, because goods are "lumpy" or indivisible—
then trade will not take place.
All of these problems or inefficiencies affect MTNs, since an MTN is
nothing more than a marketplace where potential traders meet. To ensure
that the traders are rewarded for participating (that is, that there is something
to trade), a great deal of care is taken to establish an agenda that includes
some topics or issues of interest for each of the parties that are willing to
trade.4 Trade can then occur both within and across issues. Trade within an
issue is exemplified by tariff negotiations in which countries make bids and
offers on the levels of specific tariffs.5 In principle, if there are enough issues,
cross-issue trade may allow agreement if within-issue trade proves insuffi-
cient to generate an improvement over the status quo for all concerned.
Thus, for example, agreement on a definition of subsidies could be made
contingent on agreement that stricter rules be imposed on emergency pro-
tection against imports. In terms of the negotiating process, linkages play a
fundamental role in fostering agreement because they allow side-payments
to be made.
The problem facing negotiators is generally twofold: when and what to
link. The question of when to link is a function of the type of situation
confronting the negotiator. If negotiations reach a point at which there are
insufficient mutual gains to be achieved by cooperating within a given issue-
area—that is, the gains are distributed too asymmetrically—cross-issue link-
4. Prior to and during an MTN, the national authorities, industries, and bureaucracies will
be engaged in a domestic negotiation to determine interests, priorities, and possible trade-offs.
It is this work that leads to the establishment of the agenda.
5. In the case of tariff negotiations, barter is less of a constraint, since the effect of trades
can be expressed in quantitative terms. However, there is still no generally accepted medium
of exchange.
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696 International Organization
age quickly becomes necessary.6 The question of what to link is isomorphic
to the question of what to trade. The conditions necessary for fruitful issue
linkage (for gains to be made through trade) are then immediately obvious:
the marginal valuations of different issues must vary across nations, and the
proposed linkages (trades) must result in outcomes that make all parties
better off than the status quo.7 This assumes that there are no credible threat
strategies—that is, if no agreement is reached, the status quo will be main-
tained. But this does not have to be the case. If credible threat strategies
are employed, it is, of course, crucial to incorporate these into the analysis,
as discussed below.
Historically, GATT Contracting Parties have tended to constrain them-
selves to trade-offs within issue-areas, owing to their practice of establishing
separate negotiating "groups" for each issue.8 As a result, any attempts to
link across issues have generally been made only at the end of a negotiation,
since it is only then that positions on issues are completely mapped out and
the need for linkage becomes clear. However, trade-offs at this point tend
to be made at a high political level, under substantial time pressure, and
with little (if any) analytic input. In addition, linkage at this point tends to
focus more on achieving a balance of gains and concessions (reciprocity)
than on increasing potential joint gains.9
Balancing gains and concessions is relatively easy in the case of tariff
negotiations, but it becomes much more difficult when the subject of ne-
gotiation is broadened to include NTMs, whose effects may be difficult to
quantify. The problem is twofold: (1) while tariffs can be changed incre-
6. See Robert Tollison and Thomas Willett, "An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous
Issue Linkages in International Negotiations," International Organization 33 (Autumn 1979),
pp. 425-49; and James K. Sebenius, "Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues
and Parties," International Organization 37 (Spring 1983), pp. 281-316. Note that even if cross-
issue linkage is not necessary to achieve agreement, it may be fruitful in terms of increasing
mutual gains.
7. As noted by Tollison and Willett, this requires that agents agree on the nature of the set
of Pareto-optimal outcomes. This will be a function of the availability of information. The less
information agents have about the issues, the "fuzzier" the Pareto-optimal set will be. See
Robert D. Tollison and Thomas D. Willett, "Institutional Mechanisms for Dealing with Inter-
national Externalities: A Public Choice Perspective," in Ryan Amacher and Richard Sweeney,
eds., The Law of the Sea: U.S. Interest and Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: American En-
terprise Institute, 1976), pp. 97-100.
8. This is also the case in the ongoing Uruguay Round, which was launched in 1986 by a
declaration that established fourteen subjects for negotiation. The following procedural con-
straint was imposed: "Balanced concessions should be sought within broad trading areas and
subjects to be negotiated in order to avoid unwarranted cross-sectoral demands." See Finger
and Olechowski, The Uruguay Round, p. 237; emphasis added.
9. From a practical political perspective, the term "reciprocity" has traditionally been used
in the sense of a balance of gains and concessions. In both the U.S. and Economic Community
(EC) context, reciprocity is currently used in the sense of attainment of a "level playing field"
and equivalent market access. In this article, I follow the more traditional interpretation. For
more information on various interpretations of the term, see Robert O. Keohane, "Reciprocity
in International Relations," International Organization 40 (Winter 1986), pp. 1-27; and Alan
L. Winters, "Reciprocity," in Finger and Olechowski, The Uruguay Round, pp. 45-51.
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Issue linkages 697
mentally, NTMs tend to be "lumpy" or indivisible;10 and (2) with NTMs,
it is much more difficult to translate the value of issues and proposals into
a common denominator. The general barter problems become more stringent
when NTMs are involved, since it will be more difficult to make side-pay-
ments. Because policy issues are "lumpier" than tariffs, gains from trade
become more difficult to realize.
In the case of NTM discussions, cross-issue linkages require explicit in-
itiatives on the part of negotiators and policymakers. In practice, such ini-
tiatives occur relatively infrequently." Possible explanations for this are not
difficult to find. From the perspective of a negotiator from a particular coun-
try, going beyond within-issue trade-offs in an attempt to maximize potential
joint gains via cross-issue linkages is likely to bring about increased benefits
for some domestic interest groups but losses for others. While this will be
compensated by greater net gains for the country as a whole, the losers are
likely to be more vocal about their losses than the gainers are about their
gains, in large part because the latter are likely to be much more dispersed
than the former. The implication is that cross-issue linkage can involve
greater political difficulties for negotiators, who are often faced with the
situation of having to "sell" the deal to domestic constituents without having
the power to compensate potential losers. This is one of the reasons why
reciprocity in the sense of obtaining a balance of gains and losses within an
issue-area is often considered to be critical in MTNs. The problem of "sell-
ing" the deal to domestic constituents is then simplified.
Related to this is the fact that cross-issue linkages tend to be more trans-
parent in negotiations regarding NTMs than in those regarding tariffs. The
latter are often so complex that it is difficult to determine exactly what trade-
offs have been made. In addition, it is often possible to exempt specific
industries or products in the case of tariff negotiations, while this is difficult
in the case of NTM negotiations. In either case, however, other practical
problems with attempting to achieve cross-issue linkages are that the balance
attained in other issues may be upset and that this may lead to bureaucratic
"turf" problems. Indeed, it is sometimes the case that negotiators are ex-
plicitly precluded from pursuing cross-issue linkages.
All of these difficulties could justify a hypothesis that policymakers are
"rationally ignorant" about possibilities for increasing joint gains.12 How-
ever, this does not mean that improving on the status quo is impossible.
Policymakers have many instruments at their disposal to compensate do-
mestic losers. The point is that nations are engaged in a positive sum game.
As long as there are potential joint gains, compensation problems should
10. In only a few cases can an NTM be converted into a tariff equivalent, such as the producer
subsidy equivalent or the effective rate of assistance. The problem of quantification is discussed
further in a subsequent section of this article.
11. As noted above, the Uruguay Round declaration appears to actively discourage cross-
issue linkage attempts.
12. I owe this term to an anonymous referee of International Organization.
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698 International Organization
not be allowed to prohibit cross-issue linkages. Instead, these problems
should be identified and dealt with by the appropriate policymakers. Greater
transparency as to which parties gain and lose is required. Often the groups
that may be affected negatively in the future are the ones currently benefiting
from protection of some sort, and the question needs to be raised whether
the benefits (rents) accruing to these groups are worth the costs to the nation.
To a large extent, the problems inhibiting cross-issue linkages are the same
ones that hamper trade liberalization. Thus, elements of a solution will be
similar to those suggested in the literature on the political economy of pro-
tection. In particular, it is necessary that the costs of existing measures of
protection be publicized more and that interim measures be put in place to
lessen the adjustment burden if this protection is reduced.13
As noted previously, negotiators in MTNs do not have much scope to
deal with compensation issues. For this reason, issue linkage is likely to
require the introduction of high-ranking officials into the negotiation process.
Not only would these officials need to be able to deal with the compensation
problems associated with cross-issue linkages, but they would also have to
explore with their counterparts where linkages are required and which par-
ticular trade-offs seem feasible.14 So as not to unnecessarily upset attained
agreements on issues where interests have been balanced, linkage efforts
should focus especially on issues where no agreement seems feasible.
A precondition for all of this is that the need for cross-issue linkage exists.
Thus, there is a need for analytic methods (1) to determine ex ante the
potential need for cross-issue linkage and (2) to identify specific linkages
that could lead to an outcome which is beneficial to all parties involved in
the negotiations. How this could be done is the subject of the next two
sections, which focus on quantitative and qualitative procedures.
Modeling MTNs: quantitative approaches
Two related quantitative approaches have been proposed in the literature
focusing on MTNs. The first calculates the effects of various possible agree-
ments on variables such as net trade, employment, and welfare and will thus
be referred to as an economic approach.15 The second is a game-theoretic
approach that focuses on the interaction of players and, in particular, on the
13. For a detailed discussion of these matters, see Samuel Laird and Gary Sampson, "Case
for Evaluating Protection in an Economywide Perspective," The World Economy 10 (June
1987), pp. 177-92; and Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988).
14. To some extent, this is already done; see Winham, International Trade, p. 66. However,
while the focus of the newcomers is often on deadlocked issues, cross-issue linkages are rarely
pursued.
15. See, for example, Cline et al., Trade Negotiations; Deardorff and Stern, The Michigan
Model; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Assessment of the Tokyo
Round; and John Whalley, Trade Liberalization Among Major World Trading Areas (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985).
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Issue linkages 699
distribution of payoffs associated with various solutions (equilibriums) to
the MTN "game."16 The general procedure in both approaches is to specify
an objective function and to compare proposals in relation to the status quo
by calculating payoffs.17 The feasibility of this depends on the type of issue
that is being negotiated.
With the economic approach, it may be relatively easy to quantify the
effects of various proposals if negotiations focus on existing levels of pro-
tection. Often, however, what is being negotiated are NTMs or contingent
trade policy measures. To analyze the effect of altering NTMs, it is necessary
to have information about (estimates of) tariff equivalents of the relevant
instruments, and this information is often difficult to obtain. If what is being
discussed are rules relating to contingent actions, it will be necessary to
analyze and compare the effects of differing rules of behavior that will be
applied only under specific circumstances. Although a major beneficial effect
of agreeing to a rule is a reduction in uncertainty for traders, the economic
impact of following the rule is often impossible to quantify.18
The economic approach assumes that the negotiators' objectives can be
captured adequately by the particular variable or variables chosen, but it is
often impossible to express all considerations in terms of economic variables
alone. Thus, although this procedure is well suited for an ex post economic
analysis of the results of a negotiation, it will be less relevant if the negotiator
is interested in determining the scope for agreement ex ante.19
In game theory analyses, both noncooperative and cooperative game ap-
proaches have been used. Noncooperative approaches assume that each
nation acts to maximize its payoffs subject to the actions of all others.
Cooperative approaches assume that participants act to maximize joint pay-
offs (the value of the game) and focus on optimal ways to distribute the
16. See, for example, Deborah L. Allen, "Tariff Games," in S. J. Brams, A. Schotter, and
G. Schwoediauer, eds., Applied Game Theory (Wuerzburg: Physica-Verlag, 1979), pp. 270-84;
Robert E. Baldwin and Richard N. Clarke, "Game Modeling the Tokyo Round of Tariff Ne-
gotiations," Working Paper no. 1588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge,
Mass., March 1985; and Kenneth S. Chan, "The International Negotiation Game: Some Evi-
dence from the Tokyo Round," Review of Economics and Statistics 67 (Spring 1985), pp.
456-64.
17. A payoff should be understood to comprise the realization of the objective function for
a given proposal or outcome.
18. The problem here is the same one that arises if an analyst desires to quantify the effects
of the Tokyo Round codes of conduct: many of the effects are inherently unquantifiable. See
Robert Stern, John H. Jackson, and Bernard Hoekman, Assessment of the GATT Codes of
Conduct, Thames Essay no. 57, Trade Policy Research Centre (Aldershot, U.K.: Gower Press,
forthcoming).
19. The empirical literature consists primarily of analyses of tariff negotiations. Quantification
in the case of tariffs is relatively easy because the difference between the method and degree
of tariff reduction proposed by any nation can be measured and compared with that of the
status quo. Theoretical approaches to modeling MTNs also tend to focus on tariff negotiations.
For two examples and references to the literature, see Wolfgang Mayer, "Theoretical Consid-
erations on Negotiated Tariff Adjustments," Oxford Economic Papers 33 (February 1981), pp.
135-53; and Raymond Riezman, "Tariff Retaliation from a Strategic Point of View," Southern
Economic Journal 48 (January 1982), pp. 583-93.
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700 International Organization
payoff (equilibriums or solutions). Cooperative or "value-type" solutions
are based on different sets of "reasonable" axioms (assumptions) and are
usually rather ad hoc ways of selecting specific Pareto-optimal outcomes.20
When analysts calculate value solutions, it is implicit that agreement will be
by consensus, which has traditionally been the GATT practice.21
While the value solutions described in the literature are normative, they
are useful because actual outcomes can be compared with those predicted
by various solution concepts. This is an interesting exercise, since it allows
some insight to be gained into the relative importance of distributive versus
efficiency considerations in determining actual outcomes of MTNs. In an
investigation of the tariff proposals made during the Tokyo Round, Kenneth
Chan concluded that the proposal finally chosen (the Swiss proposal) is best
explained by solution procedures that emphasize "fairness" considera-
tions.22 That is, he found that the Swiss proposal distributed the gains from
liberalization across players in proportion to the weight (contribution) of
each player. Solutions based on efficiency—that is, the maximization of the
sum of gains across countries, independent of the distribution—did not work
well. A similar result was found by Deborah Allen for the Kennedy Round.23
These findings are quite intuitive, since they reflect the "reciprocity ap-
proach" that underlies MTNs. To the extent that trading (linking) of issues
does not occur, outcomes can be expected to reward players proportion-
ately.24
A problem with the existing quantitative literature is that there is no focus
on the scope for an agreement. This is largely due to the fact that analyses
are ex post. Thus, no account is taken of how an agreement is reached, what
the role of threat strategies (if any) was, and so forth. This does not mean,
of course, that it is impossible to address this issue using a quantitative
approach. The problem, however, is the need for quantification of payoffs.
The use of existing quantitative approaches is generally only feasible if
analyses focus on successfully concluded tariff negotiations. Tariffs are only
20. Cooperative game equilibriums for MTNs have been calculated by Allen in "Tariff
Games," Baldwin and Clarke in "Game Modeling," and Chan in "The International Negotiation
Game."
21. In the Tokyo Round, a number of side-agreements (codes) with limited membership were
negotiated, implying that consensus no longer can be taken as the norm. Although GATT
formally requires that its members treat nations on an MFN basis, in practice some degree of
discrimination occurs. See Stern, Jackson, and Hoekman, Assessment of the GATT Codes of
Conduct.
22. Chan, "The International Negotiation Game."
23. Allen, "Tariff Games."
24. In "Game Modeling the Tokyo Round," Baldwin and Clarke note that while there are
solution concepts that come close to predicting the solution actually chosen, in reality the
Tokyo Round tariff negotiations had an outcome that was much inferior to the one that would
have resulted from the application of the Swiss proposal. They argue that this was due to the
large number of exceptions made in the final stage of the negotiations as countries attempted
to achieve reciprocity and satisfy domestic interest groups. This led to a movement away from
rather than toward the Pareto frontier.
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a small aspect of MTNs, however, and for many of the issues that currently
are discussed, quantification of payoffs is not possible. In this case, since
neither the economic nor the game-theoretic modeling approach can be used,
an alternative approach is needed.
Determining the scope for agreement:
a qualitative approach
In the discussion that follows, I assume that the subject of negotiation pre-
cludes quantification. In any MTN, issues can be considered to be exoge-
nously given by the agenda.25 In practice, given the large number of GATT
members (currently ninety-six), the first step of analysis is to determine
which nations are the most important ones and which are "like-minded" on
an issue. The latter requires a determination of each player's objective. In
general, the three most important players are the European Community (EC),
Japan, and the United States. Depending on the issue, they will be joined
by other nations or blocs of nations. Developing countries often negotiate
(implicitly) as a bloc. In general, all nations with equivalent positions on an
issue can be regarded as one "player" for purposes of analysis.26 Deter-
mining the objectives per issue per nation usually will not be too difficult,
since these are often well publicized. If necessary, interviews with the rel-
evant policymakers should be undertaken to help determine objectives.
The next step is to construct a set of proposals that represent as parsi-
moniously as possible alternative solutions for each issue. For each issue
to be analyzed, it is necessary to identify a minimal number of key attributes
or elements that are controversial and need to be resolved. A set of possible
proposals then can be constructed by varying the "realizations" of these
elements. There is usually a sufficient amount of information available for
this purpose. Indeed, there is sometimes too much information, and it is
necessary to narrow things down. This is usually not a problem, since many
aspects of a potential agreement on an issue are not controversial and thus
will appear in all proposals. These can be ignored. Other aspects conceptually
address the same issue and can be combined.27
The goal is to be able to compare the payoffs under alternative proposals
25. How these agenda items are determined is a separate question. While it is of great interest
in itself, for the purposes of determining the scope that exists for agreement once the MTN
has started, the agenda can be treated as given.
26. Throughout this article, the term "player" is used in this sense. It is not used to refer
to a formal coalition.
27. While there is an element of "art" involved in the determination of the set of possible
proposals, the procedure is less sensitive to subjective influences than might be thought. Par-
ticipants in MTNs usually make clear what they perceive to be the problems on an issue. In
cases in which a nation offers no explicit proposals for change, it is likely that the nation
considers the status quo to be acceptable. Given a comprehensive analysis of the status quo,
most analysts should end up identifying a similar universe of possibilities.
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with the payoff under the status quo.28 In doing this, the possibility for
coalition formation must be taken into account. Coalition formation can be
important if an agreement has to apply on a most-favored-nation (MFN)
basis; it is, of course, necessary if nonsignatories are to be excluded from
benefiting from the agreement (the non-MFN case). In the MFN case, co-
alition formation may help achieve an agreement. The point is that even
though benefits of an agreement are "public," there might be incentives for
at least a subset of nations to cooperate.29 Obviously, a need to determine
"values" for all possible coalitions in an MTN would lead to difficulties. In
the GATT context, however, there are some constraints on coalition for-
mation. In particular, certain players must belong to a coalition for it to be
viable. In practice, these players have been the EC, Japan, and the United
States. They were members of all of the agreements negotiated during the
Tokyo Round, and it is difficult to envision any major multilateral trade
agreement that would exclude one of them. Imposing the constraint that
these three players must belong to a coalition greatly simplifies the analysis
because many coalitions will not be viable.
In general, a minimal condition for agreement to be possible in any case
(including a case in which privileged groups or clubs can form) is that "in-
dividual rationality" constraints are met. This means that each player must
benefit as much under the proposed agreement as under the status quo or,
in cases in which there are credible threats, as much as if no agreement were
reached. To determine whether these constraints are met, it is not necessary
to be able to quantify payoffs precisely; all that is required is that alternatives
be comparable to the status quo or no-agreement outcome. To see this, it
is useful to characterize more concretely from a trade policy perspective the
general problem facing a nation when negotiations focus on NTMs. Assume
that any exporting nation faces two possible states of the world: one in which
a "trade policy action" is taken against it by an importing nation and one
in which nothing happens. If "action" occurs (if a measure that directly or
indirectly affects trade flows is taken), it will follow a "rule," be it implicit
or explicit. Presumably, if there is an agreement that applies to the policy
area in question, the rules embodied in it will be followed. With this in mind,
the exporting nation can then compare its current expected payoff under the
28. Alternatively, if use is made of credible threat strategies, payoffs must be compared to
the no-agreement outcome.
29. For an analysis of when coalitions will form in cases in which it is impossible to exclude
nonsignatories, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1965); and Thomas Schelling, Micromotives of Macrobehavior (New York:
W. W. Norton, 1978). A necessary condition is that the nations which are able to agree will
benefit sufficiently so that free riding by the rest of the world does not endanger the agreement.
In cases such as this, Olson refers to these nations as a "privileged" group; Schelling speaks
of "k-groups," with "k" being the minimal number of parties necessary for agreement to be
feasible. Economists generally speak of "clubs," although usually in a context in which ex-
clusion is possible. See Richard Cornes and Todd Sandier, The Theory of Externalities, Public
Goods, and Club Goods (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
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Issue linkages 703
status quo rule with that under alternative rules.30 This approach is equally
applicable to importing nations. Thus, the analyst can assume that the im-
porter also faces two states of the world: one in which action is necessary
and one in which it is not. In the case of an importing nation, the question
then is what kind of rules it is willing to subject itself to ex ante.
This can be stated in slightly more formal language: each nation can be
assumed to be attempting to maximize the expected value of its objective
function, W, or in a two-state world, max W = TTUJ + (1 - v)U0, where Uo
is the utility realized if no action occurs (or is necessary), IT is the probability
of an action, j indexes a possible rule, and Uj is the utility given an action
that follows the rule.31 The problem of a nation or bloc is then to choose a
rule so as to maximize Uj, subject to the individual rationality constraint
that Uj > Una, where Una is the utility derived from the no-agreement out-
come.32 This may reflect the status quo rules or procedures, or it may reflect
payoffs in a case in which threat strategies are carried out. Thus, it is im-
portant to determine what Una is per player per issue.
In most cases, comparison of various rules on a given issue relative to
the status quo will be all that is needed. This is because threats, if carried
out, are likely to lead to an outcome that is worse than the status quo for
all concerned. If this is the case, any proposal ranked above the status quo
for all participants will be an improvement in comparison to the threat out-
come, the individual rationality constraints will have been met, and an agree-
ment should be feasible. Even if proposals represent only a slight improve-
ment over the status quo, there may still be substantial scope for agreement
to occur because threats exist. On the other hand, if carrying out the threats
will make a nation better off than under the status quo, comparisons must
be made with the no-agreement (threat) outcome rather than the status quo.
In these cases, the need for issue linkage is quite apparent, since without
linkage it would be difficult to restrain a nation from carrying out its threats.
Taking into account the existence of credible threat strategies is therefore
important in terms of determining the scope for agreement.
If cardinal information were available, comparisons of payoffs would be
straightforward and unambiguous. In practice, however, only ordinal infor-
mation is available, and this is usually all that is required to compare alter-
natives to the no-agreement outcome. Of course, there may be difficulties
in specific situations. For example, if outcomes associated with one policy
option appear to be slightly better than those associated with another option
but the policymakers are not really confident about this, a ranking of options
30. As noted previously, however, if threats exist, comparisons need to be made with the
payoff associated with the no-agreement outcome.
31. The objective function and its attributes are left undetermined at this point, since they
will depend on the issue at hand. An alternative objective might be the maximization of output
or the minimization of political losses.
32. This implies that although ir will depend on many things, its determinants are not relevant
in this connection.
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may not be possible. However, in such cases, the options are for practical
purposes equivalent.
For an analyst to be able to evaluate proposals in terms of whether they
are better or worse than the status quo for each player requires information
on their preferences (objectives) and the weight they place on the elements
or attributes characterizing the various possible proposals.33 Often, much of
the required information can be obtained from published sources. If there
is some ambiguity, as there is likely to be, especially for new issues, it is
necessary to communicate directly with the parties involved. This can be
done formally by means of questionnaires or informally through interviews.
At this point, something needs to be said about strategic behavior, es-
pecially the misrepresentation of preferences and its implications for the
analyst. Obviously, negotiators (acting on instructions from their capitals)
will at times behave strategically. Thus, a distinction needs to be made
between goals and tactics. Much of the actual negotiating that occurs is a
function of tactics, and strategic behavior is likely to be rampant here.
However, this is not of great concern, since what is fundamental to the
analysis are the ultimate goals (objectives) of the relevant players. While
strategic behavior remains possible and may lead to failure of the negotia-
tions, the scope for misrepresentation of preferences is limited by the fact
that the goals are often publicly debated and determined and are thus rel-
atively clear.34
Given identification of the relevant players, possible proposals, and a
comparison of the proposals in relation to the status quo, it is easy to de-
termine the scope that exists for an agreement. Formation of a grand coalition
(consensus) will be impossible if even one relevant player considers the
outcome of a proposal to be less beneficial than the no-agreement outcome.
What about the formation of privileged groups or clubs? For clubs to form,
it is necessary that at least two players believe they will benefit more under
a given proposal than under the status quo.35 In practice, whether players
choose to form a club depends on the circumstances and, in particular, the
extent to which the benefits to signatories outweigh any costs of free riding
by nonsignatories. But even if benefits to signatories are large, this is only
a necessary condition for an agreement to be feasible. It is not sufficient.
If the analysis of an MTN along the lines discussed above indicates that
agreement is unlikely on certain issues, the next step is to determine if there
33. This information is a minimal requirement. If enough unambiguous information is avail-
able, it may be possible to rank order proposals. To do this, it is necessary to be able to
determine the marginal effect of slight changes in the proposals. However, a complete rank
ordering is not required to determine the scope for agreement.
34. That strategic behavior can lead to failure to agree is well known. For an analysis of the
various ways in which this behavior can lead to a breakdown of discussions, see Howard Raiffa,
The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
35. That is, if Uj > Una for at least two players for the same j , a club could form. In the
GATT context, however, a club will only be viable if the major trading nations or blocs are
members of it.
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
00
20
81
83
00
03
44
94
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 0
7:
31
:3
7,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
Issue linkages 705
are any issues that can be linked.36 In general, for cross-issue linkage to be
feasible, it is necessary that the major disagreeing players perceive their
interests to be opposed on both issues and that the issues offer sufficient
scope for trade-offs. A central problem is the difficulty of ensuring that the
disagreeing players can find "linkable" issues on the agenda.37
For linkage to be manageable, nations need to form blocs on specific issues
and then trade these issues as blocs. This applies especially if a consensus
agreement is required but also applies if attempts are made to form a club.
In a multilateral setting, nations with the same preferences on one issue are
unlikely to all have the same preferences on another. Issues therefore need
to be chosen carefully so that linkage will be feasible and fruitful. To de-
termine which issues can be linked most fruitfully, it is necessary to rank
the issues across nations in order of increasing relative importance. To
maximize potential gains and thus the scope for agreement, each nation or
bloc must be willing to give concessions on an issue it cares relatively little
about in return for gains on an issue it cares relatively much about.
In the next section, the proposed qualitative approach is illustrated by
focusing on an issue that has been on the agenda of the international trade
policy community for a lengthy period of time: rules on emergency protection
or safeguards.
An application: the scope for agreement
on safeguards
Safeguards are actions taken to protect domestic import-competing indus-
tries from problems related to increases in imports ("market disruption,"
"import surges," and so on). Article XIX of GATT allows these actions to
be taken when imports seriously harm domestic industries or threaten to do
so. Measures of support under Article XIX are to be temporary and non-
discriminatory—that is, they are to apply to imports of all origin. Further-
more, affected exporters have the right to retaliate if compensation is not
forthcoming or is deemed to be inadequate.38
In the last decade, safeguard actions increasingly have been taken through
procedures and mechanisms that circumvent GATT. Voluntary export re-
straint (VER) agreements are a prominent example.39 One of the objectives
36. The same applies if there are no credible threat strategies and it appears likely that an
agreement will improve on the status quo only marginally for one or more players.
37. In principle, of course, it is not necessary that issues all be on the agenda. If there were
a requirement, theoretically it would limit potential gains, but it also might simplify things,
since ensuring that many "linkable" issues are on the agenda would make it easier for the
GATT Contracting Parties to agree on an agenda in the first place.
38. For recent works that focus on safeguards and emphasize the importance of the issue
for the multilateral trading system, see Bernard Hoekman, "Services as a Quid Pro Quo for a
Safeguards Code," The World Economy 11 (June 1988), pp. 203-15; and Gary Sampson, "Safe-
guards," in Finger and Olechowski, The Uruguay Round, pp. 143-52.
39. GATT, Review of Developments in the Trading System (Geneva: GATT, 1988).
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of the Uruguay Round is to develop an agreement on safeguards which will
lead nations to stop applying "gray-area" measures such as VERs. Because
the issue of safeguards was discussed at length in the Tokyo Round and
because not much has changed since then, I will start by focusing on the
last MTN.
The Tokyo Round
The major actors in the Tokyo Round have been the EC and the United
States. Other participants have included Japan; industrialized countries that
are small open economies (SOEs), such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
Sweden, Norway, and Finland; the newly industrializing and other devel-
oping countries; and, finally, a number of countries with nonmarket econ-
omies. Among the participants, the Nordic countries had positions similar
to those of the EC; the remaining SOEs and the nonmarket economies had
positions similar to those of Japan; and the positions of the newly indus-
trializing countries and other developing countries—that is, the less devel-
oped countries (LDCs)—were very close to each other. Thus, we may des-
ignate the four players as the EC, the SOE, the LDC, and the United States.
The EC's first published position with respect to the MTNs was drafted
by the European Commission in April 1973. The initial viewpoint on safe-
guards was that Article XIX of GATT should be maintained but that alter-
native procedures for the discriminatory (selective) use of safeguards should
be created and should include detailed provisions on the methods of their
application and control. The Commission proposed surveillance by a quasi-
judicial tribunal of independent experts and suggested that rights to com-
pensation be limited and that safeguards be linked to adjustment policies.40
Early in the Round, it became clear that selectivity and ex post surveillance
were to be the primary objectives of the EC.
The objectives of the United States were reflected in the report of the
Williams Commission, which concluded that the period of relief should be
limited in duration and that relief should consist of a tariff increase if at all
possible. If import quotas were to be used, they should be auctioned and
the revenue should go to the importer's treasury.41 Strict preconditions should
be satisfied before an action could be imposed. With respect to selectivity,
the U.S. position was not clear. Although a preference for nondiscriminatory
application of safeguards was expressed, this was not a burning issue. In
practice, the United States was not opposed to consensual selectivity but
wanted to block any move toward unilateral selectivity.42
40. Sidney Golt, The GATT Negotiations, 1973-1975: A Guide to the Issues (London:
British-North American Committee, 1974).
41. U.S. Government, United States Policy in an Interdependent World (The Williams Com-
mission Report) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 66-67.
42. See Sidney Golt, The GATT Negotiations, 1973-1979: A Guide to the Issues (London:
British-North American Committee, 1978), p. 26; and Winham, International Trade, p. 199.
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Both LDC and SOE approached the issue of safeguards from the per-
spective of a target. The main goal of SOE was the retention of the MFN
application of Article XIX. The view was that safeguard actions should be
multilateral, subject to stricter conditions, and placed under international
surveillance and that adjustment should be linked to any safeguard action.
Thus, nondiscrimination and satisfaction of preconditions for action were
the major considerations for SOE. Most of the initial effort of LDC focused
on obtaining special and differential treatment in the application of Article
XIX actions. The position of many developing countries was that safeguard
measures taken by industrialized nations should not pertain to them unless
GATT developed and pursued a procedure to determine that the exemption
would be impractical or unwarranted. They also suggested that different
standards should apply to developing countries with respect to the definition
of concepts such as serious injury and cause of injury.43 However, if these
countries were not granted exemption and the safeguards were to be applied
to them, LDC strongly favored nondiscriminatory application. LDC also
emphasized that the right to compensation should not to be limited in any
fashion.
A typology of possible safeguard agreements is offered in Table 1. There
are twenty-four possible types of agreement, each of which will determine
a different payoff to the four players identified above. Possible agreements
are characterized by different rules regarding compensation, preconditions
(criteria for actions), and discrimination (selectivity). These three dimensions
capture all of the stated objectives of the players, and they also cover most
of the theoretical possibilities. Three types of remedies are also distinguished
in Table 1: freely allocated quotas, tariffs or auctioned quotas, and domestic
measures such as adjustment assistance or subsidies. I assume that if quotas
are allocated freely, compensation does not have to be considered explicitly,
since this occurs implicitly. This is not the case if tariffs are used or if quotas
are auctioned and the revenue goes to the importer's treasury.44 Three pos-
sibilities with respect to the application of an agreement are distinguished:
unilateral selectivity, consensual selectivity, and nondiscrimination. Note
that nonborder measures (measures that do not directly affect trade flows
across borders) will usually be nondiscriminatory in effect by definition.
Along analogous lines, it can be assumed that each player's utility function
for safeguards (U) has three components: compensation (C), preconditions
(P), and selectivity (S). Thus, U! = U! (C,P,S), where i = EC, LDC, SOE,
or the United States. For SOE, U, > 0, U2 > 0, and U3 < 0, where the
subscript numbers denote the first partial derivative relative to the status
quo magnitude of C, P, and S. The LDC position that developing countries
43. Glick, Multilateral Trade, p. 34.
44. My discussion of the Tokyo Round does not focus on domestic measures, since they did
not play an important role in the negotiations. They may play a greater role in the Uruguay
Round, however.
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Issue linkages 709
should be exempt from safeguard actions cannot be captured in the table,
since it implies an indeterminacy as to a position on what rules should be
applied. Nothing was offered by LDC in order to obtain the desired exemp-
tion, and it became clear early in the negotiations that exemptions would
not be granted.45 Thus, for the purposes of analysis of the options noted in
Table 1, the position of LDC will be taken to be a preference for nondis-
crimination, even though this is "second best." This implies that the signs
for the first partial derivative of LDC will be the same as those for SOE.
For the United States and EC, the first partial derivatives are more difficult
to sign, since importing and exporting interests have diverging preferences.
I will assume that importing interests dominate, and therefore U! < 0 and
U2 < 0 for both the United States and EC. However, U3 > 0 for EC, while
U3 < 0 for the United States.
Based on the goals of the participants, it is clear that SOE and LDC had
positions relatively close to that of the United States and that all of these
positions were substantially at variance with that of EC. The primary ob-
jective of EC was to block a nondiscrimination obligation, while that of LDC
and SOE was to achieve nondiscrimination. As discussed above, SOE put
relatively greater emphasis on preconditions than did LDC or EC, while
LDC put greater emphasis on compensation.46 For the United States, strict
preconditions were considered to be fundamental. On the issue of selectivity,
its major objective was to block unilaterally imposed selective measures.
The scope for a possible consensus agreement is determined by the number
of proposals that are ranked above the no-agreement outcome by all of the
players. In the context of the safeguard issue, the no-agreement outcome
was equal to the status quo and consisted of VERs and related trade mea-
sures. There were no threat strategies that went beyond a proliferation of
VERs. VERs are represented by B" in Table 1 and are characterized by
consensual selectivity, relatively weak preconditions, and rents accruing to
exporters. Arguably, the status quo also includes procedures such as anti-
dumping measures, which could be used de facto for safeguard purposes.47
45. That is, free riding of this sort was considered to be unacceptable by the major players.
This is not surprising, since safeguard issues usually involve LDC exports. It is clear that
within-issue trade-offs were useless for LDC in attaining its goal. The question, then, is why
the option of cross-issue trades was not pursued.
46. One explanation for this could be that LDCs have less faith in their ability to make full
use of more stringent procedural requirements. Alternatively, they might not trust importing
nations to adhere to them.
47. Dumping occurs when a firm sells a product abroad for less than it charges in its home
market. In the absence of a home market (or in the presence of one that is too small), dumping
occurs when the export price is below the fully allocated cost of production. If an exporting
firm is found to be dumping and also to be causing injury to domestic import-competing firms,
an antidumping duty can be levied. Alternatively, the exporter is often allowed to undertake
the elimination of the dumping margin by raising its export supply price. Antidumping proce-
dures can be used as substitutes for safeguards because criteria for receiving protection are
less strict, and it is often not too difficult to show that dumping has occurred. See Bernard
Hoekman and Michael Leidy, "Dumping, Antidumping and Emergency Protection," paper
presented at the Research Seminar of the GATT Secretariat, Geneva, October 1988.
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In the context of Table 1, these actions can be represented by D, A, or B,
depending on whether a unilaterally selective tariff is imposed (D) or an
undertaking to eliminate the dumping margin is made by the affected ex-
porter. If an undertaking is made, the relative stringency of preconditions
that have to be satisfied will determine whether it is equivalent to A or B.
However, in the discussion that follows, B" will be taken to represent the
status quo, since VERs are the most prevalent substitute for GATT-con-
forming safeguard actions.
The question, then, is which proposals regarding quotas and tariffs were
better than the status quo for each player? Alternatively, which proposals
were worse than the status quo? For LDC, proposals worse than the status
quo were A-F, which implied unilateral selectivity, and F" and D", which
removed compensation. F" was worse than the status quo because it would
be equivalent to the VER regime but without the implicit compensation,
while D" was worse than the status quo because on the margin LDC attached
greater weight to compensation than to preconditions. Proposal E" was
equivalent to the status quo as far as exporters such as LDC were concerned,
and everything else with the possible exception of F' represented an im-
provement.48 For SOE, the same held true as for LDC, except that D" was
considered better than the status quo because on the margin SOE preferred
more preconditions to more compensation. For the United States, proposals
worse than the status quo were A-E, E", F", and F'. In general, the United
States was against unilateral selectivity. E" was worse because it implied
the same preconditions as under the status quo but at greater cost, while F"
and F' were worse because they implied no compensation and weak pre-
conditions. EC was the only player whose "bliss point" was close to the
status quo. EC preferred discrimination, no compensation, and relatively
weak preconditions, and the status quo incorporated two out of three of
these desiderata. The proposals better than the status quo included A, B,
D, F, D", and F". D" was better because on the margin EC preferred relatively
more stringent preconditions over compensation.
Given that the only proposals which would improve on the status quo for
EC would be worse than the status quo for LDC, it is clear that little scope
for a consensus agreement existed. What about clubs?49 By assumption,
only three possibilities existed for a potential privileged group: (1) the United
States and EC; (2) the United States, EC, and SOE; and (3) the United
States, EC, and LDC. It was concluded above that EC preferred A, B, D,
F, D", and F" to the status quo (B") and that these would be worse than the
48. F' could be worse if the benefits of nondiscrimination were outweighed by the costs
associated with losing compensation and having relatively weak preconditions.
49. There are three possibilities: (1) a club forms, and the agreed safeguard rules are applied
on a non-MFN basis; (2) a club forms, and the agreed safeguard rules are applied on an MFN
basis; and (3) the potential for a club exists, but agreement is impossible because of the MFN
constraint. In the third case, free riding is presumably considered to be unacceptable to the
potential club members.
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Issue linkages 711
status quo for LDC. However, D" was preferred to the status quo by three
players: SOE, the United States, and EC. Thus, a privileged group could
have formed on the basis of this preference. There are several possible
explanations for the fact that it did not form. First, the MFN requirement
of GATT was felt to be a binding constraint. Second, D" was only marginally
better than B" for SOE. Third, the D" proposal was similar to A and D
procedures, and since these procedures already exist, they may be viewed
as a stronger version of D". Note also that LDC, SOE, and the United States
had other proposals in common that they would have preferred to D". Given
the options, SOE and LDC preferred an agreement incorporating nondis-
crimination, relatively strong preconditions, and compensation—that is, A'
or C . The United States preferred an agreement incorporating relatively
strong preconditions, nondiscrimination, and a tariff remedy—that is, C or
D', depending on its stance on compensation.50 The goal of SOE, LDC, and
the United States might then have been to persuade EC to accept a proposal
along the lines of A' or C This, of course, would have required linkage of
issues. As noted earlier, linkage would also have been necessary for LDC
to attain its most preferred option (an exemption). The obvious question,
then, is why no linkages were attempted.
Although there is no definitive answer to this question, one hypothesis is
that the policymakers were "rationally ignorant," as discussed above. An-
other is that there was insufficient awareness of the scope for making trade-
offs across issues. Potential linkages certainly existed, examples including
concessions by LDC on import licensing, subsidies, or government pro-
curement. From a policy perspective, the interesting question is whether
there have been any subsequent changes that will allow for an agreement
to emerge without cross-issue linkages in the ongoing Uruguay Round.51
The Uruguay Round
While there were four players or blocs in the Tokyo Round, there are
presently at least six players in the Uruguay Round negotiations on safe-
guards. The United States, the EC, and Japan should now all be regarded
as separate players. Australia, Hong Kong, South Korea, New Zealand, and
Singapore formed an explicit coalition (the Pacific group) for purposes of
negotiations concerning this issue and submitted a joint proposal in May
1987. This group's position is closer to that taken by SOE during the Tokyo
Round. During 1987, Switzerland, Brazil, and Egypt all supported proposals
for the use of domestic measures rather than border protection. The position
50. Although the United States was not extremely concerned with the compensation question
during this negotiation, it is the nation that has offered compensation most frequently in the
past when invoking Article XIX actions. See Sampson, "Safeguards."
51. Information on the Uruguay Round is based on interviews with and documents supplied
by trade policy officials and diplomats.
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of most of the developing countries is similar to that taken by LDC during
the Tokyo Round.
Since the issues are identical, the characterization of possible agreements
along three dimensions remains relevant to the Uruguay Round. What about
the positions? Although the United States formally continues to express a
preference for nondiscrimination, it is likely that it will push for some kind
of consensual selectivity in the Uruguay Round. According to informal dis-
cussions with EC trade officials, the recognition that unilateral selectivity is
not in the EC's own interest is emerging. This altered perception may be
due to the fact that the EC increasingly has become the target of selective
actions itself. It is unlikely, however, that the EC will formally change its
position to one of favoring a nondiscrimination requirement. For one thing,
the fact that it has already invested so much political capital in this issue
will make it difficult to admit that it was "wrong." But in any case, it seems
certain that unilateral selectivity is a dead issue. Consensual selectivity has
become much more likely, since it makes unilateral selectivity impossible
while allowing for flexibility to negotiate bilateral agreements or to impose
nondiscriminatory actions. In addition, part of the Japanese bureaucracy is
now reported to be in favor of consensual selective actions because this
gives it greater internal control over Japanese industries. This group in gen-
eral favors a managed economy and managed trade. Another group favors
Japan's traditional standpoint of nondiscrimination. For the most part, small
open economies and developing countries continue to prefer nondiscrimi-
nation, and nondiscrimination is explicitly required in both the Pacific group
proposal and the Swiss/Brazilian proposal.
What about the relative weights of the three elements of a proposal? For
the United States, the relative ranking of attributes in the Uruguay Round
appears to be the same as during the Tokyo Round. Relatively strong pre-
conditions are considered to be the most important element, while compen-
sation is regarded as the least important. The EC continues to prefer rela-
tively weak preconditions (to maintain discretion) and puts little weight on
compensation. Primary criteria for the EC are to avoid unilateral selective
actions by the United States, avoid having to pay explicit compensation,
and remain as flexible as possible. For Japan, relatively strong preconditions
are again more important than compensation. For the Pacific group, non-
discrimination is considered to be of fundamental importance, followed by
preconditions and compensation. Although this ranking also holds true for
Switzerland and Brazil, the two countries disagree with each other on the
issue of compensation (Switzerland is opposed to compensation), and they
disagree with the Pacific group on the proposed remedy (Switzerland and
Brazil favor domestic measures to promote adjustment). Most developing
countries continue to have the same ranking of attributes as during the Tokyo
Round: nondiscrimination is fundamental, followed by compensation and
preconditions.
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Issue linkages 713
Nondiscrimination is thus considered crucial by three blocs (the Pacific
group, Brazil/Switzerland, and the developing countries), while the position
of the "big three" is ambivalent but may be drifting toward consensual
selectivity. For these three individual players, two cases must be distin-
guished, depending on whether consensual selectivity or nondiscrimination
is decided. Assume for the moment that all three push for consensual se-
lectivity and that the status quo is B". The problem for the other players,
then, is that the status quo is close if not identical to what is best for the
EC, and it is also better for the United States and Japan than it was during
the Tokyo Round. An agreement such as A" might be feasible, however,
since this is also somewhat close to B" and thus not too bad for the EC and
since Japan and the United States both prefer A" to the status quo. For all
of the other players, A" is also preferred to the status quo. As noted above
for the Tokyo Round, an alternative candidate for the most preferred option
by the EC is D", in which the increasing stringency of the preconditions of
an agreement are traded off by removing the compensation requirement. D"
is better than the status quo for Japan and the United States but is worse
than the status quo for the developing countries.
Three conclusions can be drawn: (1) there is ample scope for a club of
the big three; (2) there is some scope for a consensus agreement; and (3)
there is a problem for the other players because the status quo may be closer
to being optimal for the big three in the Uruguay Round than it was during
the Tokyo Round. A formalization of the status quo is not in the interests
of the players that prefer nondiscrimination. The implication is that there is
as much, if not more, need for cross-issue linkage as there was during the
Tokyo Round. Attempts to establish linkages will have to be initiated by the
players whose preferences are furthest from the status quo.
If the big three all push for nondiscrimination, it is clear that achieving a
consensus agreement will not be a problem. For example, even if the EC
were to regard an agreement such as A' to be too stringent, B' should be
feasible and would improve on the status quo for all players. If the big three
part ways on the issue of selectivity, more interesting situations may develop.
For example, if the United States and the EC cannot agree, not only is a
consensus agreement unlikely to emerge, but club formation also may not
be possible. If they do agree, it is likely that Japan will go along. Linkage
in this case will again be required to attain an agreement.
Although it is unlikely that within-issue trade-offs will suffice to foster
agreement, there are many possibilities for cross-linkage because the agenda
of the Uruguay Round is broad.52 The qualitative approach outlined above
can be used by analysts, negotiators, and policymakers to determine the
scope for agreement. This, in turn, should lead to the identification of link-
ages to improve mutual gains from trade.
52. For a suggestion that focuses on trading off services and safeguards, see Hoekman,
"Services as a Quid Pro Quo."
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Conclusions
Investigating the potential for cross-issue linkages during MTNs is a pro-
ductive strategy for participants, especially in cases in which agreement
seems unlikely to occur. Determining the need for such linkages requires
analysis. Since this analysis often cannot employ quantitative techniques, I
have suggested a qualitative approach that identifies like-minded nations
(players) and possible proposals (solutions) through a method of comparing
the anticipated outcome of proposals to the status quo or no-agreement
outcome for each player. This conceptually simple method may not always
be easy to apply, but it should give a good indication of what the scope for
agreement is and where there is a need for cross-issue linkages. Implemen-
tation of a linkage strategy will not be a trivial matter, and there are many
procedural questions and problems that have to be addressed.53 However,
the main problem is substantive, in that there must be a willingness to explore
the cross-issue linkage option and deal with the constraints that inhibit link-
ages from occurring.
Negotiators and relevant policymakers presumably have enough political
knowledge and skill to conduct an analysis along the lines set out above.
Indeed, to some extent they will have to do something of the sort in order
to be able to negotiate at all. While there may be reasons for policymakers
to be "rationally ignorant" of procedures that identify the scope for joint
gains, this cannot be taken to imply that the recommended analysis is su-
perfluous. Even though analysts can argue along the lines of the public choice
literature that what is real is rational, this does not mean that it is impossible
to do better. In any event, the "rationally ignorant" policymaker is not the
only constraint on exploring possible linkages, since there are also infor-
mational and resource constraints, especially on the part of developing coun-
tries. Thus, even if we could not prevail upon negotiators and policymakers
to undertake this type of analysis, there is certainly a case to be made for
independent analysis to help fill the gap.
To a large extent, the constraints that limit the feasibility of cross-issue
linkages in MTNs are the same ones that inhibit liberalization of trade pol-
icies. Domestic constituents that stand to lose from a change in the status
quo tend to have greater political clout than those that stand to gain. The
trade policy literature on the political economy of protection argues that the
gains from trade need to be incorporated into policy via the greater trans-
parency of the costs to society when intervention in trade occurs.54 This line
of reasoning is applicable to MTNs as well as to domestic policy formulation.
If negotiators are forced to limit themselves primarily to within-issue trade-
offs, not only will potential gains from trade be lost, but import-competing
industries will also find it easier to defend existing rents. The result is likely
to be detrimental to the multilateral trading system.
53. See Bernard Hoekman, "Developing Country Participation in the Uruguay Round,"
Discussion Paper no. 225, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Mich-
igan, Ann Arbor, August 1988.
54. See J. Michael Finger, "Incorporating the Gains from Trade into Policy," The World
Economy 5 (December 1982), pp. 367-77; Laird and Sampson, "Case for Evaluating Protec-
tion"; and Bhagwati, Protectionism.ht
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